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The co-emergence of sets and functions 
in Hermann Weyl’s Das Kontinuum 
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 The chapter I of Das Kontinuum invites us to rethink, in a radical way, 
the nature of the relations between the two main categories of mathematical 
entities: sets and functions. An outstanding point of this reform is what I 
called the “co-emergence” of sets and functions within the mathematical 
universe. In other words, none of these two types of entities come first in the 
genesis of this universe. Sets and functions cover the totality of it and came 
from the same “mathematical process”. 
 
 What does this co-emergence mean? 
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 What can we learn from it about the nature of the relations between 
the notion of set and the notion of function in Das Kontinuum? 
 
 To make explicit Weyl’s position and to test its consistency, we will 
study the nature of sets and functions from a strictly logical and 
mathematical point of view. 
 
In this way, we are putting deliberately the continuum problem aside. 
Nevertheless, the continuum problem constitutes the heart of Weyl’s project 
and gives to the mathematical construction his pertinence, submerging it in 
the theoretical project of physics. In this way, the arithmetical construction of 
the continuum is justified from the outside and on the whole. However, the 
internal point of view on the first chapter of Das Kontinuum is legitimate in 
the opinion of Weyl himself1. 
 
 
Thus, let’s take this mathematical and logical point of view, and let’s 
return to the co-emergence of sets and functions. This feature of Weyl’s 
system seems to have not been very studied. In fact, the first chapter of Das 
Kontinuum is often studied by the means of axiomatic reconstructions. This 
method permits to have a comprehensive view on the system and permits to 
make a direct comparison with similar systems. However, all the axiomatic 
reconstructions I know conceal partly the common nature of sets and 
functions in this system. For example, the translation of Weyl’s system in 
usual notations often compels us to replace the single mathematical process 
by several comprehension axioms (one for sets and one for functions). Thus, 
without really betraying Weyl’s system, these reconstructions are inadequate 
for the understanding of the specificity of Weyl’s notion of function and of its 
particular relations to the notion of set. 
 
 
But Weyl’s conception of the relations between the notions of function 
and set merits our attention. Indeed, Weyl turns upside down the order 
between the notion of function and the notion of set that is the one of Set 
Theory. Our comparison with Set Theory is not arbitrary. Since it is not only 
the theory that is used as a basis for numerous mathematical disciplines 
today but this theory is also the starting point of Weyl’s thought on the 
mathematical foundations2. 
 
 
                                   
1 [1918], Preface, p1. 
2 [1918], p47 
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Let’s remind us that, in Set Theory, a function is nothing but a 
particular kind of set. A function is likened to its graph. A function from X to Y 
is a particular subset of the product X*Y. “particular” means that this subset 
must verify the property of uniqueness of the “y” for each “x”. 
 
In fact, Set Theory use another notion of function; that which is used, 
for example, in the wording of Fraënkel’s replacement axiom for the 
axiomatic theory ZF. In this other sense, a function is a two-arguments 
predicate whose arguments are not restricted to two sets X and Y. A 
function, in this sense, can apply to any set in order to define another set. 
But such a function is only an intensional entity to which we cannot assign 
any extension3. A function, in this sense, is not really an object from the 
mathematical universe of Set Theory but it is rather a definitional entity that 
takes part in the definition of sets. 
 
 
If we pay attention only to the extensional notion of function, the 
functions are thus kinds of set. We don’t have to be surprised by this result 
since Set Theory defends an ontological monism. The universe of Set Theory 
seems to be plentiful but all its entities must be placed under one single kind: 
they are all “sets”. Functions are ontologically derived. That is, their 
admission in the mathematical universe needn’t axioms in addition to those 
that are given for the existence of sets.  
 
 
In the opposite direction, sets and functions spring up simultaneously in 
Weyl’s system. The mathematical process stands in for the comprehension 
axiom. It permits to assume simultaneously sets and functions in the 
mathematical universe. It is what I called “co-emergence”. However, we 
don’t have an ontological dualism since sets and functions are defined so that 
sets become kinds of functions. The inclusion between sets and functions is 
therefore turned upside down in comparison to Set Theory. We have still an 
ontological monism but this is not this time a Set Theory but rather a function 
theory. 
 
The link between these two notions is however stronger in Weyl’s 
system. Indeed, the notion of set is integral part of the notion of function. 
                                   
3 This assertion would have to be qualified if we considered the situation from the point of view of Classes 
theory, for example that of Bernays and Von Neumann. From this point of view, the kind of functions 
intervening in the replacement axiom is regarded as a kind of class. Their status is then ambiguous. A class 
is an extensional entity only in a weak sense. Most of the operations allowed for sets are forbidden for 
classes. This point is not however very important according to our intention??.  
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Thus, the notion of function is an extension of the notion of set. On the 
contrary, in Set Theory, none of the two notions were the extension of the 
other. 
 
 
After having emphasized the originality of the relations of the notions of 
set and function in Weyl’s position, we propose carrying out two tasks: 
 
 
1) First, we will lighten the meaning of this “co-emergence” of sets and 
functions in Weyl’s system, making explicit the reasons for their having a 
common nature and for the origin of their distinction. 
 
 
2) Secondly, we will explain why Weyl was compelled to assume, in his 
mathematical universe, these odd entities that he called « functions » and 
whose notion is the origin of the turning upside down we have expounded. 
 
 
Owing to the reasons given above, we will try to complete these tasks 
analysing how Weyl himself sets out his system in the first chapter of Das 
Kontinuum and in a letter to Hölder4. 
 
In order to complete the first task, we must first outline Weyl’s position 
in 1918 about the (internal) foundations of mathematics. We will base our 
sketch on the text of Das Kontinuum, on two articles of Solomon Feferman, 
and on personal thoughts. 
 
 
This position can be sketched by four terms: definitionism, intuitionism, 
predicativism, and arithmetism. Let’s explain what those terms mean. 
 
Definitionism 
This position consists in refusing to assume the insertion of a new ideal 
object (that is a set or a function) if it is not introduced by the way of giving 
explicitly the relation which links together the constituent elements of this 
ideal object. We can express it in a different way asserting that each 
extensional entity must be introduced by the means of an intensional entity. 
                                   
4 [1919] 
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Intuitionism 
Secondly, his mathematical universe is restricted in the sense that all 
the entities assumed must be generated by the logical principles from the a 
basic category of entities which are given intuitively. This basic category is a 
very structure made up of primitive objects and relations. The intuitive 
knowledge we must have of those entities must give foundations to the 
Excluded-Middle Principle. Each rightly built proposition, which concerns only 
the primitive entities, admits one truth-value, regardless our ability to 
determine it. Weyl expresses it asserting that such a category is a “complete 
system of definite self-existent objects”. This kind of “intuitionism” is 
therefore far from Brouwer’s one to which Weyl adhered a few years later. 
Predicativism 
 Weyl refuses every impredicative definition, that is every definition 
which supposes the prior given information of a totality of entities of which 
the object to define is one of the members. Weyl’s predicativism is expressed 
by the “restricted principle”. In a language which is not that of Weyl, it 
consists in restricting the scopes of the quantifiers to the primitive entities. 
This principle permits to eliminate impredicative definitions while it expresses 
the privileged access we have to the basic categories. In the language of the 
Ramified Type Theory(RTT), introduced by Russell and Whitehead in the 
Principia Mathematica, the restricted principle consists in assuming only the 
entities of level 1. 
The logical principles 
 Those three major thesis of Weyl’s position (definitionism, intuitionism 
and predicativism) gives rise to the formulation of 6 logical principles which 
can be indifferently interpreted as principles of the construction of 
propositions or as principles of the construction of relations. 
 
There are six principles: 
1) The negation principle 
2) The blanks-identification principle 
3) The conjunction principle 
4) The disjunction principle 
5) The “filling in” principle 
6) The “there is” principle5 
                                   
5 [1918], p9-10 
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We don’t give details of those principles. Let’s remind us solely that 
they permit to construct each property (or relation) which can be expressed 
in the first-order-predicates language, from the primitives relations, and 
including symbols for sets, functions and for the membership relation Є. 
Arithmetism : natural numbers and iteration 
 
 The completeness condition, which Weyl demands from the basic 
categories, is a very strong one. Owing to this fact, Weyl develops only one 
such category: that of natural numbers. 
 
 The natural numbers series is important in Weyl’s position because it 
makes up the intuitive datum which permits the foundation of a new type of 
definition of relation (the principle of iteration) and therefore a new form of 
inference(the inference by complete induction). 
 
Two types of intuition are linked to the natural numbers series. 
 
1) We have the intuition that gives us the natural numbers series as a 
complete system. 
 
2) We have the intuition of the iteration. We mean here the intuition by 
which we can assert that, when we have an homogeneous relation (that 
is a relation which links each object to another object of the same 
nature), we can then consider the iteration of this operation an 
indefinite number of times. 
 
 
Those two intuitions are linked together because: 
 
1) The category of natural numbers can be regarded as the totality of the 
elements obtained by the iteration of the “successor relation” from the 
number 1. 
 
2) The completeness of the natural numbers series exports itself to the 
outside, in a way, by the means of the intuition of iteration. Let’s take 
an homogeneous one-to-one relation R(x,y) (x and y belong to any 
same category) Then, the totality of the elements obtained by the 
successive iterations of the relation “R” must be regarded as a 
complete system just like the natural numbers series itself. 
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Those two intuitions (that of the « completeness » of the natural 
numbers series, and that of the possibility to repeat indefinitely the iteration 
of an homogeneous operation) are blending together so that Weyl seems to 
confuse them entirely: 
 
«[…]the idea of iteration, i.e., of the sequence of the natural numbers, is 
an ultimate foundation of mathematical thought »6  
 
 
 
 The second feature we have expounded is an essential one for Weyl’s 
system. I choose the term “transcendence” to designate this distinctive 
feature of Weyl’s theory by which the completeness of natural numbers series 
exports itself outside. This property of Weyl’s system shows that he had, in a 
way, a formal conception of natural numbers in spite of his rejection of a 
formalist opinion on mathematics. His conception of natural numbers is a 
formal one in the sense that what is important in the natural numbers series 
is its structure. But it is not a formalist opinion because Weyl didn’t think at 
all that this structure emerges from an arbitrary choice. We have to remind 
that the natural numbers series is given intuitively to us, and is given in such 
a way that we know it is a complete totality and we know that its 
completeness exports itself to other series. We are then far from a formalist 
position. 
 
 
(We can’t here develop all the arguments we have to show that Weyl’s notion 
of the natural series is a in a way a formal one. The main arguments are: 
- Weyl’s assimilation of the idea of the iteration and of the idea of the 
natural numbers series. 
- Weyl’s refusal to base the natural numbers series on the definition of 
an essence for each isolated natural number. The only satisfactory way 
to define a number is to give is place in the succession.7 
- Weyl’s agreement with an axiomatic point of view on the natural 
numbers series (providing that we give their real status to axioms). 
- The fact that, in Das Kontinuum, nothing is told about the nature of 
natural numbers but in relation with their succession. 
- The particular form of the principle of iteration wich assumes Weyl. Cf 
above) 
                                   
6 [1918], p48 
7 cf [1918] p47 for the refusal of Frege’s and Russell’s trial to define each natural number as an equivalent 
classes. Cf [1949] I. 6, p34 where Weyl asserts that “the succession of numbers appears as their constitutive 
characteristic”. 
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The principle of iteration 
 This principle is the principle of construction that expresses, at the 
logical level, what we have called the transcendence of the natural numbers 
series. According to this principle, a totality of sets obtained by successive 
iterations of an homogeneous set-operation Φ(X) can be regarded as a 
complete totality, available for the definition of a new entity. 
 
 
 The schema below illustrate the meaning of this principle in the 
simplest case. 
 
 
 
 
a) 
   successor function     successor function 
1     2     3 … 
 
 
 
This totality is complete. We can thus use, in order to define a new entity, a relation like 
“there is a natural number n such as…” 
 
  
 
 
Transcendence of the natural numbers 
series 
 
 
b) 
  homogeneous function Φ    homogeneous function Φ 
X1     X2     X3 … 
 
 
 
This totality is complete. We can thus use, in order to define a new entity, a relation like 
“there is a set among (X1, X2, …) such as…” 
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Explanation of the relations between sets and functions in Das Kontinuum 
 
Having reminded the main thesis of Weyl about the foundations of 
mathematics, we can now carry out the two tasks we had proposed to us. To 
explain the relations between sets and functions we have to study the nature  
of the transition from intension to extension. 
 
The mathematical process 
We have already referred to the fact that this transition works, for sets 
and functions, by the same way: the process that Weyl calls “mathematical 
process”. Let’s see how it works. 
 
 
 Let’s assume we have a relation R( , , …) that is constructed in 
accordance to Weyl’s principles and which can therefore be used for the 
definition of an ideal entity. (this kind of relation is called “finitist” by Weyl). 
Each argument is linked to a category which can be basic or not (a category 
of sets, etc.) We have to suppose that the arguments are divided in two 
groups: the dependent ones and the independent ones. 
 
 
R (  x1 ,  …  ,  xk  |  y1,  …  ,  yn) 
 
    Dependent   Independent 
    Variables   Variables 
Case of sets 
 
 Let’s talk firstly of the case n=0, that is the case where there is no 
independent variable. Then, the mathematical process links to the relation R 
( x1 ,  …  ,  xk) the k-dimensional set Ř. Two factors step in this transition 
from the relation to the set: 
  
1) The variables disappear. In Frege’s way of speaking, the set Ř is a 
saturated entity on the contrary to the relation from which it is 
constructed. 
 
2) The identification criterion changes. Let’s quote Weyl : 
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« Therefore, how two sets […] are defined […] does not determinate 
their identity [on the contrary to relations] Rather an objective fact, 
which is not decidable from the definition in a purely logical way, is 
decisive; namely, whether each element of the one set is also an 
element of the other, and conversely. » 
 
Case of functions 
 
 Let’s assume now that n≠0, that is there is at least one independent 
variable. Then, the mathematical process links to the relation R (  x1 ,  …  ,  
xk  |  y1,  …  ,  yn) the function Ř(y1,  …  ,  yn). For each possible value of the 
arguments, the function Ř(y1,  …  ,  yn) becomes a set. This transition from 
the relation to the function includes two factors: 
 
1) One part of the variables disappears (the dependent ones). 
 
2) The identification criterion changes in a similar way to the case of sets. 
Two functions are identical if their values are identical for each possible 
determination of the variables. 
 
Thus, We find again the same two factors. 
 
Before giving details about it, let’s make two remarks. 
 
 First, we can see immediately the difference between this notion of 
function and the set-theoretical one. Indeed, in Set Theory, the value of a 
function can be of any nature whereas in Weyl’s system the value of a 
function can’t be a basic object. In fact, to express a one-to-one relation 
between basic objects, the notion of set (in Weyl’s sense) is enough. (such a 
relation can be rendered in Weyl’s system by a two-dimensional set Ř which 
verify the property that for each x there is a y such as « (x,y) Є Ř ». this 
property is a finitist one) 
 
 Secondly, we can see now the exact relation between the notions of 
sets and functions in Das Kontinuum. We remark that the notion of function 
is defined by the means of the notion of set. Sets become borderline cases of 
function: those where the number of independent variables has been 
reduced to 0. That’s why we said above that the notion of function were an 
extension of that of set. 
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 We have distinguished two moments within the transition from 
intension to extension: 1) the abstractive moment and 2) the change of 
identification criterion. In fact, each of those two processes have is own 
autonomy. This autonomy is a distinctive feature of Weyl’s system which is 
never explicitly explained in Das Kontinuum. But Weyl gives a few indications 
in this direction in some remarks and he confirms this fact in his Letter to 
Hölder. Those two moments are not only distinguishable but they can also be 
separated in a way. 
 
Explaining this separation, we will be able to lighten the relations 
between sets and functions in Das Kontinuum as for their common nature as 
well as their distinction.  
The common nature of sets and functions 
To understand their common nature, we just have to consider 
individually the second moment of the transition between intension and 
extension. 
 
Weyl asserts that the identification criterion of relations(that is 
intensions) is a purely logical one. It means that the identity between two 
relations must be decided on solely from their definitions by the way of their 
logical structure. 
 
At the opposite side, the criterion of identification of sets and functions 
is irreducible to logical aspects. Weyl asserts that it must be based on an 
“objective fact”. In fact, such an objective fact is given to us by the means of 
the intuitive access we have to basic categories. Thus, this basic-category 
intuition is what is needed to give a content to the logical entities. That 
intuition is the condition to enter in the very domain of mathematics. We can 
see this is an attitude close to the kantian one. 
 
To summarize, in the mathematical process, takes place the very 
synthesis of logic and intuition. It permits the constitution of the 
mathematical universe. This synthesis works in a similar way for sets and 
functions and explains their common nature. 
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    Processus mathématique  
I Intension       Extension 
 
     
 
 Logical       Mathematical 
Point of view        synthesis of logic  Point of view 
over relations     and intuition  over sets and functions 
 
 
 
The origin of the distinction between sets and functions 
We can see that the abstraction process can be separated from the 
change of the identification criterion because the abstraction process step in 
already at the intensional level, that is at the logical level of the relations. 
Indeed, two principles of construction given by Weyl use explicitly sets and 
functions: the principle of substitution and the principle of iteration. But, in so 
far as those principles are used to the logical definition of relations, they 
must be conceived prior to the extensional level. Indeed, the mathematical 
universe emerges in Weyl’s position from a single application of the 
mathematical process. 
 
 
Thus, how is it possible that sets and functions, which are the 
extensional entities, step in the use of intensional principles? 
 
 
This problem can be solved easily if we assume the distinction of the 
abstractive moment and the moment of the identification-criterion change, in 
the transition from intension to extension. Indeed, Weyl, in a few brief but 
essential notes, asserts that the sets and functions used for the definitions 
are not sets and functions in the full sense of those terms8.  
 
 
We can see that those particular notions of set and function, which 
Weyl describes as “purely formal” ones, correspond to abstract entities for 
which the identification criterion is still a logical one. This fact is confirmed by 
the fact that Weyl forbids the use of the extensional identity for the definition 
of relations. 
                                   
8 [1918], p40 « in a purely formal way » and note n°35. cf also [1919] 
Julien Bernard-www.philo-bernard.fr-The co-emergence of sets… 
 13 
This distinction between those two moments (of the transition from 
intension to extension) shows that the distinction between sets and function 
in Weyl’s system can be found in the only abstractive moment before the 
distinction between intension and extension. Functions are obtained by 
keeping independent some variables. It amounts to saying that functions are 
partly abstracted entities whereas sets are totally abstracted entities. 
 
 Let’s take the same example as above: 
 
R (  x1 ,  …  ,  xk  |  y1,  …  ,  yn) 
 
    Dependent   Independent 
    Variables   Variables 
 
  
When we form the function Ř(y1,  …  ,  yn), we erase the distinction between 
all the k-dimensional systems (x1, …,xk) which are linked to each 
n-dimensional system (y1, … , yn). This process by which we erase the 
distinction between some entities is the essence of the abstraction for Weyl 
in a quite classic way of thinking. Functions are then partly abstracted in the 
sense that some residual variables are always present after the transition 
from intension to extension. 
 
 
The distinction between sets and functions is now clear. We now have 
to explain why Weyl was compelled to assume, in his mathematical universe, 
those partly-abstracted extensional entities which he calls “functions”, that is 
those kinds of hybrid entities between relations and sets. 
 
Why was Weyl compelled to assume « functions » in his mathematical 
universe ? 
 
We can found several reasons that have unequal importances. 
 
1) The possibility to apply partly the abstractive process supplies a 
convenient means to “fit” relations into other relations, according to their 
dimension. In his Letter to Hölder, Weyl gives the example of a 5-dimensional 
relation R (u, v | x, y, z). He shows that the possibility to distinct the 
independent variables from the dependent ones permits to consider this 
relation as a “binary relation which depends on the three parameters x, y, z 
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and is realized between u and v”. This relation can then become an object for 
any relation S(X) whose argument refers to a binary relation. Thus, the 
possibility to abstract relations is a means for regarding a relation as an 
object for another relation. And the possibility to apply partly this abstractive 
process permits to make fitting the dimensions of the relations we want to 
connect. 
 
 
2) However, there is a deeper reason to the fact that Weyl assumes 
“functions” in his system. Indeed, it was a necessary condition for Weyl in 
order to maintain his particular predicativist position, without assuming 
Russell’s RTT. 
 
We have already referred to the fact that Weyl expressed his 
predicativist position by the way of the restricted principle, that is by the 
prohibition to regard a set as a given totality available for the definition of a 
new relation. But mathematics, and analysis in particular, can’t be developed 
without the possibility to use, for definition, totalities of ideal objects. This 
restriction is partly compensated by what I called “arithmetism”. Indeed, 
Weyl’s arithmetism permits to regard a countable totality of sets as available 
for the definition of a new relation, provided that this totality is given by the 
way of a “finitist” relation. 
 
More precisely, if a totality of sets is given by the means of a set (of 
level>1) then the “restricted principle” forbids us to quantify over the 
elements of this set. On the opposite, if the totality of sets is given by the 
way of a relation on which the abstractive process have been partly applied, 
leaving independent the variable which is used to enumerate the sets, then 
we can regard this totality of sets as available for definitions, without 
infringing the restricted principle. 
 
Let’s give an example. 
 
We can speak of a real number as a set of rational numbers. If we want 
to speak about a single real number, then a set is enough. For example, √2 
can be defined as the extension of the property «x²<2 ». On the other hand, 
we can speak about the series √n only if the argument “n”, which is a part of 
the relation by which the series is defined, have not been abstracted. Thus, 
we define the relation R(x|n) which means « x²<n » and we apply the 
mathematical process, without abstracting the “n”. We obtain a function Ř(n) 
which was the series we were looking for. This series is available for the 
definition of a new relation. 
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Weyl shows more generally that we have to use this kind of “function” 
everywhere we have to use a totality of sets for definition. The partial 
abstraction is then a means to use totalities of sets in a system where the 
quantification over sets is forbidden. 
 
 
3) In fact, the situation is more complex because the use of functions and 
sets, in Weyl’s system, becomes fertile only when it is used simultaneously 
with the principle of iteration. Indeed, we could prove the fact below: 
 
Sterility of sets and functions without the principle of iteration  
 
For every basic-objects finitist property P(x), which is defined without the 
use of the principle of iteration, there is a property P’(x) which is 
equivalent to P and which is defined without any reference to a set or a 
function. 
 
(Weyl lets us think that this is a distinctive feature of his system. But he 
doesn’t prove it nor express it clearly. Nevertheless, we can see briefly that it 
is true on an example. 
 
Let’s suppose we have a finitist property P(n) of natural numbers which 
is defined without the use of the principle of iteration. Let’s suppose 
moreover that the definition of P uses only one function: θ(t). For each t, this 
function refers to a set of natural numbers. 
 
The only principles that use a function in Weyl’s system are the 
principle of iteration and the principle of substitution. Since we have 
supposed that the principle of iteration was not used to define P, we must 
admit that the function θ(t) bas been substituted to a set-variable “X” in the 
definition of P. But the only primitive relation which uses sets(or functions) in 
Weyl’s system is the membership relation Є. Therefore, P must be a property 
logically derived from the two-arguments relation: “( s Є θ(t) )” without using 
another function or set (by hypothesis). Now, Weyl’s definitionism compels us 
to admit that the function θ(t) has been obtained by a partial abstractive 
process over a two-arguments relation of natural numbers: T(u | t) which 
doesn’t use another set or function (by hypothesis). Thus, we know that the 
relation “( s Є θ(t) )” is equivalent to T ( s , t ). Finally, P is equivalent to a 
property P’ where all the occurrences of “( s Є θ(t) )” have been changed in 
“T ( s , t )”. P’ is defined without any use of sets or functions. QED The 
general proof must be just a little more complex) 
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Owing to this fact, we have to say that the use of the principle of 
iteration is the last grounds for the assuming of the “functions” in Weyl’s 
system. What we said in 2) (on page 13) is still right. We have to introduce 
“functions” in Weyl’s system in order to use legitimately totality of sets. But 
this introduction is fertile only because of the principle of iteration. Indeed, 
without this principle, even the operation of addition between natural 
numbers is not given in Weyl’s system. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 We began our research noting a remarkable feature of Weyl’s system: 
sets and functions (the two kinds of extensional entities) co-emerge in the 
mathematical universe. And they do it in such a way that sets become 
particular cases of functions. 
 
 
 Why is there such a turning upside out in comparison to Set Theory? 
 
 
 Separating two moments in the transition from intension to extension, 
we tried to explain the origin of the common nature of sets and functions and 
the origin of their distinction. It appeared that sets and functions are two 
kinds of abstract entities whose identification criterion is based on a 
basic-category intuition. But, unlike sets, functions are partly abstractive 
entities. Why was Weyl compelled to assume those partly abstractive 
entities? 
 
 
 The predicativist position, when it is expressed only by restricting the 
universe of the TTR to the level 1, seems not to be able to reconstruct 
analysis in an appropriate way. Russell was very conscious of it. That’s why 
he adopted his principle of reducibility. Weyl judges that it is a mere 
treachery toward the predicativist position. 
 
 
 Weyl wanted to keep faithful to the predicativist position and chose not 
to assume other entities than those of level 1. Functions, as partly abstracted 
entities, became the only way for him to use totalities of sets for definition, 
without betraying the restricted principle, which expressed for Weyl his 
predicativist position. 
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 But, in fact, this system would have been entirely sterile if this 
restriction had not been compensated by the position of Weyl I called 
“arithmetism”. The use of “functions” became fruitful because of the iterative 
principle assumed by Weyl. This principle poses a problem because we know, 
since a work of Kleene9, that it permits to get over the first level, in the strict 
sense of the TTR of Russell. Has Weyl unconsciously betrayed the 
predicativist position too? 
 
 
 I don’t know. But at least we have given a reason to understand why  
Weyl assumed this principle in its particular form. The problem raised by 
Weyl’s principle came from the fact that it permits to assume series of sets as 
complete series. We saw that this is a consequence of what I called Weyl’s 
“arithmetism”. The position of Weyl about the natural numbers series is a 
radical one not only because he assumed that this series is intuitively given 
as a complete one (in the particular sense Weyl gives to the word 
“complete”), but also because he gave to this series a transcendental aspect 
(in the sense I gave above to the word “transcendental”). In other words, 
Weyl had a very formal or structural notion of the natural numbers series. 
And the formal aspect of his notion had great consequences outside the 
natural numbers series. This is confirmed by several passages of Weyl’s work. 
He has probably never used the word “formal” for a strategic reason, 
because he didn’t want to create an ambiguity with the formalist positions 
against which he fought. 
 
 
 Therefore, from a purely mathematical and logical point of view, Weyl 
succeeded in reconstructing mathematical analysis without assuming 
quantification over sets. It is possible because of the use of functions, as 
partly abstracted entities, simultaneously with the particular arithmetism he 
defended. Nevertheless, we have to wonder if this radical position about the 
natural numbers series is more legitimated than the principle of reducibility 
itself. 
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